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One Person, One Vote: Gerrymandering and the 
Independent Commission, A Global Perspective 
JAMES RULEY* 
In 1863, on the hallowed fields at Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln encapsulated a core 
principle of democracy by describing our system as a “government of the people, by 
the people, [and] for the people.”1 This definition accurately depicts the ideal of de-
mocracy—that supreme power is vested in the citizenry, not in the government itself. 
Since the American model is based on representative democracy instead of direct 
democracy,2 extreme scrutiny must be placed upon the system of choosing represent-
atives if government is to accurately represent the will of the people.  
One of the greatest abuses of a citizen’s voting rights is gerrymandering. While 
scholars have written extensively advocating the need for restraints on legislative 
abuses of the redistricting process, little has been written about gerrymandering from 
an international perspective.3 This Note seeks to bridge that gap. Part I of this Note 
provides more context on the history and dangers of gerrymandering. Part II exam-
ines the state of redistricting commissions within the United States. Part III examines 
global practices for independent commissions. Finally, this Note concludes by 
recommending practices that could be implemented in the United States.4  
I. GERRYMANDERING AND REDISTRICTING: AN OVERVIEW 
The boundary lines that define voting districts provide an essential framework in 
a representative democracy. In the United States, each district elects one individual 
to serve as its representative in the legislature. The state legislature draws districts 
based on the results of a national census, conducted every ten years.5 Problems arose, 
however, as states refused to redraw boundary lines in response to changes in the 
population of each district, resulting in some districts having many more constituents 
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 1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1863, in 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (the text of the 
Gettysburg Address). 
 2. BUREAU OF INT’L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEMOCRACY IN BRIEF 5–7, 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/amgov/30145/publications-english/democracy-in-brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8GU-WYYS].  
 3. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 
YALE L.J. 1808 (2012); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 769 (2013) (looking briefly at global alternatives but mostly focusing on 
American redistricting solutions); Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority To Require 
State Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333 (2005).  
 4. See infra Conclusion.  
 5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2 (establishing the decennial census). 
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than other districts.6 In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that failing to up-
date boundary lines in response to changing population numbers violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, which guarantees that each person’s vote will be counted equally.7 
This principle has been encapsulated by the phrase “one person, one vote.”8 In effect, 
following Reynolds, states must draw electoral districts in a way that ensures that a 
roughly proportional number of citizens are contained in each district.9 
However, Reynolds has done little to counter another problem endemic to the 
district-drawing process: gerrymandering.10 The process of gerrymandering involves 
“dividing political units in ways that deliberately create advantages for incumbents 
or their political allies, by placing voters based on their predicted behavior at the 
polls in districts that dilute the vote of some voters and consolidate the votes of 
others.”11  
To add some clarity to that definition, imagine four districts, W, X, Y, and Z. 
Districts W, X, and Y each have nine members from the Pink Party and one member 
from the Orange Party. District Z has three members from the Pink Party and seven 
members from the Orange Party. Thus, before redistricting, the Pink Party will have 
three seats in the legislature and the Orange Party will have one. This is a fair result, 
since the Pink Party has thirty supporters (or seventy-five percent of the vote) and 
the Orange Party has ten supporters (or twenty-five percent of the vote). However, 
because the Pink Party controls the legislature, it could redraw the districting map, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. The Court found this to be the case in Reynolds v. Sims, finding that the Alabama state 
legislature specifically, and presumptively other states as well, had not properly redistricted 
for over sixty years. 377 U.S. 533, 568–70 (1964). 
 7. The Court applied this standard to both the upper house and the lower house in states 
with bicameral legislatures. Id. It is useful to note that the district-drawing process does not 
apply to those elected to the U.S. Senate, as they are elected by the popular vote of all citizens 
of a state. For an argument that U.S. Senators should be elected on the basis of state districts 
like members of the House of Representatives, see Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty 
of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1996). It is also an interesting 
practical note that the U.S. Senate, by design, violates the principle of one person, one vote, 
since California (population 37,254,503) and Wyoming (population 563,736) each have two 
representatives. California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table 
/PST045215/06 [https://perma.cc/BTS5-L9R8] (2010 census data); Wyoming, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/56 [https://perma.cc/UB6B-TQ5L] 
(2010 Census data). This violation of (or exception to) the one-person, one-vote principle is 
supported by the formulation of the Senate in Article I of the Constitution and by the 
Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. amend. XVII.  
 8. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). This 
principle has also been encapsulated in the word “equipopulous,” simply meaning equally 
populated. See Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The 
Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1333 n.14 (2005). 
 9. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing 
for the first time the principle of one person, one vote); see also Harvard Law Review 
Association, Congressional Redistricting, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 135 (1983).  
 10. “The term ‘gerrymander’ is a portmanteau of the last name of Elbridge Gerry, the 
eighth governor of Massachusetts, and the shape of the electoral map he famously contorted 
for partisan gain, which included one district shaped like a salamander.” Ariz. State 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 n.1 (2015).  
 11. Gerrymandering, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012). 
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spreading its supporters more evenly among the four districts so as to gain complete 
control of the legislature. Thus, the redrawn districting map might have seven or 
eight Pink Party supporters in each district and only two or three Orange Party sup-
porters. The Pink Party would still only have seventy-five percent of the people 
supporting it, but it could capture one hundred percent of the legislature.12  
Political gerrymandering is dangerous for a number of reasons. First, gerryman-
dering may create districts that are confusing in size and shape, leading to mis-
understandings of where constituents are to vote.13 Second, gerrymandering encour-
ages elections to be more polarizing; if the legislature gerrymanders districts 
according to ideology, then politicians are forced to run on platforms that are ideo-
logically similar to the constituents placed in those districts.14 Finally, the fact that a 
vast majority of these district elections are predetermined by gerrymanders often re-
moves real voter choice in the election and furthermore is likely to result in voter 
apathy.15 
Although a plurality of the Supreme Court determined in Vieth v. Jubelirer that 
“[p]artisan gerrymanders . . . [are incompatible] with democratic principles,”16 the 
Court has, as of yet, refused to find gerrymandering justiciable.17 The Court cited the 
difficulty in finding a workable standard as its reason for refusing to delve into the 
political thicket surrounding partisan gerrymanders.18 
States have responded to the problems created by gerrymanders in divergent 
ways, ranging from altering the balance of legislative votes needed to confirm district 
lines;19 to requiring judicial oversight of districting lines;20 to creating advisory com-
missions,21 backup commissions,22 politician commissions,23 and independent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. This example is based on class notes and personal discussions with Professor David 
Williams. Unpublished materials on file with the Indiana Law Journal. See also Christopher 
Ingraham, This Is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will Ever See, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/01 
/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/ [https://perma.cc/Z25W-UVF9].  
 13. Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Im-
pact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 338–39 (2014).  
 14. Id. at 339–40. 
 15. Id. at 340–41. 
 16. Ariz. State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2658 (2015) (last bracketed alteration in original) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 
292 (2004) (plurality opinion)). 
 17. Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, failed to find a workable standard but seemed to 
remain open to the possibility of hearing matters in the future. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306–17 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dis-
sented. Id. at 317–68 (dissenting opinions). While the Court has heard two other cases on the 
matter in recent years, it has still failed to elucidate a clear standard for hearing cases, although 
theoretically a standard might exist. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012); League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 18. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.C. 
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commissions.24 As this Note will examine in Part II, these commissions have had 
varying degrees of success in blunting the problems created by partisan 
gerrymanders.25 
II. THE ROLE OF REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The vast majority of states have not aggressively combatted the problems pre-
sented by gerrymandering.26 In those that have, reforms have occurred in three ways. 
The first type of reform alters the legislative balance of power, primarily by requiring 
a supermajority for action, so that the majority party will not dominate the redistrict-
ing process.27 The second type of reform creates supplemental commissions to either 
recommend boundary changes to the legislature or resolve boundary conflicts when 
the legislature is unable to reach a solution.28 The third type of reform creates a com-
mission to draw boundaries independent of legislative control.29 Many states have 
adopted a conglomeration of these reforms; so, for instance, some states may have 
enacted both legislative reforms and a supplemental commission.  
A. Legislative Reform 
States have employed several different methods of legislative reform to ensure 
that lines are drawn fairly. The first method, utilized by Connecticut and Maine, re-
quires the legislature to approve redistricting plans by a two-thirds majority vote.30 
The primary benefit of this plan is that, since it is incredibly difficult for a party to 
gain control of two-thirds of the legislature, it becomes much more difficult for one 
party to draw the district lines in its favor, thereby skewing the results of elections in 
the majority party’s favor.  
However, there are two downsides with this approach. First, it requires the legis-
lature to compromise and come to a consensus, often a difficult process that could 
potentially lead to gridlock.31 Second, if one party does manage to gain two-thirds of 
the legislature, a difficult, but not inconceivable, outcome, then that party would still 
be able to manipulate the lines. This problem is compounded by the difficulty the 
legislature already faces fixing bad plans: even if a majority party becomes a legis-
lative minority, the minority party cannot adjust the plan unless it achieves a two-
thirds majority. In effect, this almost ensures that if a party has a two-thirds majority, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1844 (noting that in the vast majority of states, legislatures 
still control the redistricting process); Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT 
REDISTRICTING (2015), http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/X755-Z7XQ].  
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See infra Part II.B. 
 29. See infra Part II.C. 
 30. CONN. CONST. art. XXX; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1206(1) (Supp. 2015).  
 31. This difficulty in getting these plans approved by a two-thirds majority is one of the 
primary reasons that many of these states have a backup commission, as discussed below. An 
additional concern is that legislators often oppose plans because it will make it harder for them 
to be reelected.  
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its plan will be nearly impossible to modify until the next census when the lines could 
be redrawn.  
The second method used by states to check legislative districting power grants the 
state’s highest court explicit power to become involved with districting disputes. 
Some states give the state supreme court the explicit power to review redistricting 
plans if they are challenged.32 This explicit grant of power is particularly significant 
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle to determine whether the issue of ger-
rymandering is justiciable; while the Supreme Court has been slow to review these 
cases, several states are encouraging judicial review to ensure that plans are im-
partial.33 Other states mandate that the state supreme court create a districting plan if 
the legislature is unable to reach a consensus.34 While this approach may create ques-
tions of judicial economy, it at least provides an alternative to gridlock and provides 
an incentive for the legislature to formulate a plan. An additional concern is whether 
granting the judiciary power over redistricting plans will result in a more balanced 
outcome, particularly if the members of the state supreme court share a political ide-
ology with the state legislators. This could be especially troubling if the bench were 
ideologically skewed and the justices had life tenure. While there are concerns over 
the impartiality of the judiciary,35 the judiciary would still perhaps be better suited to 
this task than legislators who would stand to reap immediate political rewards from 
their district drawing.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. These states include Colorado, COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(e); Connecticut, CONN. 
CONST. art. XXVI(d); Iowa, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 36; Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-
A, § 1206(2)–(3) (Supp. 2015); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c) (requiring the attorney 
general to petition the supreme court to enter declaratory judgment as to the validity of the 
state—but not congressional—redistricting plan); Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 10; 
Maryland, MD. CONST. art. III, § 5 (enabling review by the state’s highest court to review state 
district lines); North Carolina, N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-267.1 (West Supp. 2016) (requiring chal-
lenges to be heard by a three judge panel composed of judges from different parts of the state); 
Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 9 (allowing state plans to be challenged under the jurisdiction of 
the state supreme court; if struck down, a new plan may be made by the politician commis-
sion), Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11C; Oregon, OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2); and 
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1909 (2015).  
 33. See supra note 3.  
 34. These states include Connecticut, CONN. CONST. art. XXVI(d); Maine, ME REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206(2)–(3) (Supp. 2015); Florida, FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(b) (requiring 
the attorney general to petition the state supreme court to adopt a plan if the legislature fails to 
do so); and Missouri, MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7.  
 35. A concern here with tenure is that justices who serve for life might consistently pass 
skewed plans, while the legislature might fluctuate more dramatically due to the short term 
length. For information about judicial impartiality, see, for example, Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex 
R. Perschbacher, Perceptions of Justice: An International Perspective on Judges and Appear-
ances, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 136 (2013) (emphasizing the need for judicial independence, 
in addition to the major problem with judicial independence, recusal); Charles Gardner Geyh, 
The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493 (2014) (emphasizing the many 
facets behind our conception of judicial independence).  
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B. Supplemental Commissions 
Several states have adopted supplemental commissions designed to help their 
legislatures make informed decisions as to how boundary lines should be drawn be-
tween districts. These supplemental commissions fall into two major categories: ad-
visory commissions organized to help the legislature make informed redistricting 
decisions and backup commissions designed to step in and create a redistricting plan 
if the legislature fails to do so.  
Currently, eight states utilize advisory commissions for redistricting commis-
sions.36 While these commissions have no authority to draw lines, their recommen-
dations can have significant weight on the redistricting decisions of the legislature.37 
Further, members of these commissions are generally nonlegislators, so in theory 
they provide objective, apolitical advice on the boundary-drawing process. Yet, 
advisory commissions only serve as a partial solution to gerrymanders because the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. In Iowa, the advisory commission is formed from the legislative services agency 
(LSA). The LSA is composed of nonpartisan members who draft districting plans from criteria 
clearly delineated by statute. IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (West 2012). This input comes from a 
five-member independent commission, two members of which are appointed by the congres-
sional leaders from the majority and minority parties. The final member is chosen by consen-
sus of the four other members. The commission can propose three plans to the legislature. The 
first two must be approved or rejected without modification; the third plan may be approved 
with modifications. Id. at §§ 42.3, .5, .6. In Maine, the advisory commission is staffed by 
fifteen members, chosen equally by both parties with the final member chosen by commis-
sioners. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A. Decisions of the commission may be adopted, modi-
fied, or ignored by the legislature. ID. § 3; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1206. In New 
York, plans are proposed by a six-member commission, some of whom are political and some 
of whom are not. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (McKinney, Westlaw through 2016 legislation). 
The legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore proposals. Id. In Ohio, a six-member advisory 
committee is appointed by the state House and Senate majority leaders; two must be from 
opposing parties, and two must not be legislators. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 103.51 (LexisNexis 
2014). The findings of the advisory committee are only used for recommendation purposes. 
Id. In Rhode Island, an eighteen-member commission consisting of legislative and non-
legislative members provides assistance in developing districting plans and also “issue[s] an 
annual report” to state officials. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9.1-31(a) (2016). In Vermont, a seven-
member commission is composed of nonlegislative members chosen by the governor, the chief 
justice, and parties’ state committee chairs. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1904 (2015). The 
Legislature may adopt, modify, or ignore proposals. Id. In Virginia, an eleven-member com-
mission is formed from five members from each major party and one commissioner who is to 
be not associated with any party. ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, 
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., EXEC. ORDER NO. 31, ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENT BIPARTISAN 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REDISTRICTING (2011). The legislature may adopt, modify, or ig-
nore proposals. Id. 
 37. See supra note 36. The weight varies state to state. A good example of an advisory 
commission holding substantial weight is Iowa. The commission can present two plans for 
approval that must receive an up or down vote before a plan may be approved with modifica-
tions. Edith Munro, Gerrymandering? Not in Iowa, TIMES UNION (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Gerrymandering-Not-in-Iowa-1336319.php [https:// 
perma.cc/6UE2-AKSQ]. The time required to prepare these plans, and the effort required to 
vote down two of them, seems to provide a good check on arbitrary modifications. Id.  
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legislature can accept or ignore the commission’s recommendations, giving it influ-
ence only relative to the respect the legislature has for its opinions.  
A second type of supplemental commission is the backup commission. These bod-
ies are designed to serve as a failsafe if the legislature is unable to approve a re-
districting plan. Backup plans vary greatly from state to state, including using the 
governor’s preferred plan,38 using the secretary of state’s preferred plan,39 delegating 
the authority to specific legislative actors,40 delegating the authority to specific non-
legislative elected officials,41 or a mixture of these approaches.42 The greatest bene-
fits of an approach that incorporates a backup commission are that these commissions 
serve both as an incentive for the legislature to reach consensus and as a means of 
ensuring that the redistricting process does not end in gridlock.  
C. Independent Commissions 
The final method states have used to combat gerrymanders is the independent 
commission. States using independent commissions delegate redistricting to a body 
other than the legislature as a whole. Unlike advisory commissions, these bodies have 
the power to determine boundary lines, not merely to make suggestions to the legis-
lature. Currently, there are two types of independent commissions: the politician 
commission and the (truly) independent commission.  
Seven states currently use politician commissions to determine state district 
boundaries, and two of those states also use those commissions to determine federal 
congressional districts.43 Politician commissions are, in a very real sense, independ-
ent—these commissions are composed of elected officials who approve a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. In Maryland, if the legislature fails to approve a plan, the governor’s plan becomes 
law. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5.  
 39. In Oregon, if the legislature fails to approve a plan, the secretary of state has the au-
thority to draw district lines. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 6(3)(a).  
 40. In Connecticut and Illinois, commissioners are chosen by legislative leadership. 
CONN. CONST. art. XXVI(b); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Indiana provides a unique twist on this 
formula. While legislative leadership chooses some candidates, the Governor chooses one ad-
ditional commissioner. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-3-2-2 (West 2006). 
 41. In Mississippi, a commission composed of the chief justice, attorney general, secre-
tary of state, and the majority leaders of the House and Senate draws the lines. MISS. CONST. 
art. XIII, § 254. In Texas, the backup commission is staffed by the lieutenant governor, the 
Speaker of the House, the attorney general, the comptroller, and the commissioner of the 
General Land Office. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.  
 42. In Oklahoma, a citizen initiative passed in 2010 created a seven-member backup com-
mission staffed by the lieutenant governor (nonvoting chair), three Republicans, and three 
Democrats. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A.  The governor, state House majority leader, and state 
Senate majority leader each gets to choose one Republican and one Democrat for the commis-
sion. Id.  
 43. These seven states include Arkansas, ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (requiring the governor, 
secretary of state, and attorney general to serve on the commission); Colorado, COLO. CONST. 
art. V, § 48 (requiring the appointment of an eleven-member commission chosen by majority 
and minority leaders, the governor, and the chief justice); Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2 
(requiring a nine-member commission, four members chosen each by majority and minority 
leaders with the tiebreaker chosen by the eight commissioners; Hawaii’s commission draws 
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redistricting plan completely separate from the legislature. A useful role is served by 
these commissions because they often seek to balance the political affiliation of com-
missioners to achieve a more representational result.44 However, if improperly con-
structed, these commissions can fall into the same pitfalls as legislative redistricting 
due to the political incentives inherently attached to the job.45 
Six states currently utilize independent commissions, which means that members 
are not allowed to simultaneously serve in the legislature.46 The idea behind these 
commissions is that since legislators are inherently biased in favor of themselves and 
their parties, the task of line drawing must be delegated to a neutral body.47 Usually, 
the majority of commissioners are chosen equally by the state political parties, with 
the deciding vote delegated to a member chosen by the other commissioners or by 
some other criteria.48  
                                                                                                                 
 
lines for state and congressional districts); Missouri, MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7 (requiring 
two commissions, appointed respectively by the House and Senate, with some members cho-
sen by the governor); New Jersey, N.J CONST. art. II, § 2, ¶ 1 (requiring a thirteen-member 
politician commission for drawing congressional lines; twelve members to be chosen by the 
majority/minority and party leaders, the deciding member to be chosen by the commissioners); 
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (requiring a ten- or eleven-member commission for state districting 
lines; parties appoint an equal number of members; if they cannot approve a plan, the chief 
justice appoints a tiebreaker); Ohio, OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1 (requiring a seven-member poli-
tician commission staffed by the governor, state auditor, secretary of state, one appointee from 
the Speaker of the House, one appointee from the president of the senate, and one commis-
sioner each from the minority leaders in the House and Senate); and Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. 
art. II, § 17(b) (requiring a five-member commission, one member each chosen by the majority 
and minority leaders in both the House and Senate, and the final member to be chosen by 
consensus of the other members).  
 44. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3, at 1817; Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh 
Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 1 (2002) (arguing that poli-
tician commissions force cooperation among politically motivated members).  
 45. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3 at 1817; Hirsch, supra note 44. Both argue that politician 
commissions can be contained by good design. However, it is important to note that poor 
design will lead to the same problems as states that rely solely on the legislature for 
redistricting.  
 46. Both Alaska and Montana have commissions, ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8; MONT. 
CONST. art. V, § 14, but these only have an impact on the state level since neither state currently 
has more than one federal congressional district. Kristin D. Burnett, Congressional 
Apportionment: 2010 Census Briefs, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2011) https://www 
.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT43-QJZQ]. The other 
four states are Arizona, ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8); California, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 8252 (West Supp. 2016); Idaho, IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2); and Washington, WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 43(2).  
 47. Cain, supra note 3 at 1818–20; Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina–
A Personal Perspective, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1301, 1327–31 (2001).  
 48. This is the case in Arizona, ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8) (requiring the mem-
ber chosen by political parties to be chosen from a pool picked by appellate judges); Idaho, 
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2(2) (requiring majority/minority leaders and political parties to 
choose a six-member panel); Montana, MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14 (requiring the members 
chosen by majority/minority leaders to choose the fifth member); and Washington, WASH. 
CONST. art. II, § 43(2) (same as Montana). In Alaska, two members are chosen by the governor, 
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Instituting independent redistricting commissions (IRCs) has been difficult for a 
number of reasons, but primarily because legislators have little incentive to delegate 
their own power when keeping it has substantial political benefits.49 Thus, the pro-
cess of institutionalizing IRCs has been largely attempted by ballot initiative,50 a 
practice that has recently been approved by the Supreme Court.51 There has been 
much argument over whether IRCs truly achieve the goal of drawing impartial 
boundary lines.52 While the purpose of this Note is not to wade into that argument, it 
seems that, on sum, IRCs have a greater likelihood of achieving impartial lines than 
leaving the process entirely up to the legislature.53 
III. INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
Although independent commissions within the United States have undergone 
scholastic scrutiny,54 little research has been done examining global practices for the 
creation and maintenance of IRCs.55 This Note seeks to bridge the gap in current 
research by examining the practices employed by IRCs around the world. To facili-
tate the navigation of this large body of research, this Note analyzes global practices 
based on factors of independence: who chooses the IRCs, what criteria determine 
how members are chosen, who has the power of removal, and what powers the com-
missions have.56 All of these factors stem from the author’s personal research and 
                                                                                                                 
 
one each by the House and Senate presiding officers, and one by the chief justice. ALASKA 
CONST. art. VI, § 8. Members are to be chosen without regard to party affiliation. Id. In 
California, members are nominated by a panel of state auditors, six commissioners are chosen 
by the parties, and the other eight are chosen randomly. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252. 
 49. For instance, the IRC in California faced serious opposition before being approved by 
ballot initiative, in part due to its chief proponent being Governor Schwarzenegger, and in part 
due to fears as to how it would reshape the legislature. Cain, supra note 3, at 1821–24; 
Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of California’s 
Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 165 (2005).  
 50. This was the case in Arizona and California. Cain, supra note 3, at 1823, 1830.  
 51. In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the 
Court held that the referendum and initiative, while not tools used at the time of the Founding, 
were consistent with the principle of popular representation and power being vested with the 
people. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2672 (2015). 
 52. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3; Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More 
Accountable to the People, Make Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 
(2010); David G. Oedel, Allen K. Lynch, Sean E. Mulholland & Neil T. Edwards, Does the 
Introduction of Independent Redistricting Reduce Congressional Partisanship?, 54 VILL. L. 
REV. 57 (2009); Bates, supra note 3.  
 53. For the debate, see, for example Cain, supra note 3; Huefner, supra note 52; Oedel et 
al., supra note 52; , Bates, supra note 3. 
 54. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 3; Huefner, supra note 52; Oedel et al., supra note 52. 
 55. Only a few articles providing an international perspective have been published. 
Anthony J. Gaughan, To End Gerrymandering: The Canadian Model for Reforming the 
Congressional Redistricting Process in the United States, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 999 (2013) 
(analyzing the benefits of Canada’s IRCs); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3 (providing an in-
sightful, but summary, analysis of other countries’ redistricting commissions);  
 56. The development of these factors stemmed, in part, from useful talks with Professor 
David Williams, as well as fellow students Alex Avtgis, Rafael Macia, Brittany Shelmon, 
792 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:783 
 
analysis of existing global IRCs. This section will explain alternative practices 
around the world and provide a brief analysis for the effectiveness of each approach. 
After looking at how practices work, this Note will analyze whether these practices 
might be effective for states within the United States to adopt.  
The reader should note that these analysis sections contain two levels of analysis. 
Some systems the author contends are inherently bad because they provide little 
oversight or protection of minority interests in the districting process. Other practices 
the author contends are bad for the United States, for a variety of reasons unique to 
the structure and history of the nation. These assertions stem from the author’s suc-
cess conditions for an independent commission: that the commission should be de-
signed to protect minority parties and should be functionally as impartial as possible.  
A. Bodies Choosing the Commission 
The first factor impacting the independence of commissions is the method by 
which commissioners are chosen. Typically, members are chosen in one of five 
ways: by the legislature, by the executive, by the judiciary, by a combination of mul-
tiple branches, or by popular election.  
1. Legislative Branch 
Commissioners appointed solely by the legislative branch are chosen either in a 
partisan or multipartisan manner. By allowing commissioners to be chosen in a par-
tisan manner, I mean that a simple majority is all that is required to approve candi-
dates. Thus, the party with control of the legislature can approve whichever 
candidates it wants to sit on the commission. Currently, only Rwanda and Japan 
choose commissioners in this manner.57 
Alternatively, other countries structure commissions in a bipartisan manner, 
where multiple parties are represented. Countries have tried to build in requirements 
for bipartisan agreement in three ways. First, as in Venezuela, bipartisan support can 
be mandated through a statutory (or constitutional) supermajority requirement.58 Sec-
ond, as in Albania, the law can grant majority and minority parties equal seats on the 
                                                                                                                 
 
Ashley Lenderman, and Sam Von Ende. However, the factors and the research to support them 
are solely the work of the author. Research notes are on file with the author.  
 57. In Rwanda, the commissioners are put forth to the Senate by the “government,” an 
undefined term within the law. Law No. 31/2005 of 24/12/2005 (Rwanda), https://repositories 
.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/5078/4170.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4CR-F99E]. The 
Constitution establishes the Commission in Article 180. CONST. OF RWANDA art. 180. In Japan, 
the Diet chooses members for a Central Election Management Council, and the Prime Minister 
formally appoints them. FREE CHOICE FOUND., ELECTION SYSTEM IN JAPAN 5 (2007), 
http://www.freechoice.jp/electionsystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/C25F-WY7W]. 
 58. In Venezuela, individuals must apply or be nominated to be considered by the legis-
lature. The legislature, while sitting in a joint session, chooses members. A two-thirds majority 
is required for approval. LEY ORGÁNICA DEL SUFRAGIO Y PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA art. 53 
(1997), http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Venezuela/Leyes/LeySufragio.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/SFU6-26QQ]. 
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commission but give the tiebreaker seat to the Speaker of the House.59 Finally, as in 
Azerbaijan, some countries require that a certain number of seats belong to either an 
independent party60 or, as in Mexico, to members deemed to be impartial by both 
parties.61  
These approaches would likely have varying degrees of success in the United 
States. First, allowing a simple majority of the legislature to approve commissioners 
does little to alleviate the fear of the political parties influencing redistricting, since 
appointees can easily serve as proxies of the political party that appointed them. 
While this problem may not be as severe in a country that rules the government by 
party coalitions (because members appointed by different parties within a coalition 
will sit on the committee), a majority party will likely control the commission due to 
the incentives within the American voting system for only two parties.62  
Requiring a two-thirds vote by commissioners to approve redistricting plans is 
problematic for two reasons. First, it is likely that this approach would result in legis-
lative gridlock within the commissions due to the difficulty of obtaining a super-
majority. Second, even though the process may grant the minority party more seats 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. Obviously, this system would still grant control of the committee to the majority party 
in the United States. However, this system at least recognizes the need for all parties to be 
represented on the Commission. This system is used in Albania, where the majority and mi-
nority parties elect two members each, and the “minority” majority parties and “minority” 
minority parties each get to elect one. The final member must be approved by a majority vote 
in the legislature. Thus, while in the United States it would give control of the committee to 
the majority party, this problem is avoided due to the parliamentary structure of government 
in Albania. ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 14 (Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. & 
trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/R98Q 
-CQ4B].  
 60. Azerbaijan elects its committee members in this way. The majority and minority party 
each get to elect six candidates, and the independent representatives also get to choose six 
seats. CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
AZERBAIJAN art. 24 (2003), http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code 
_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCU9-TVFR]. 
 61. In Mexico, ten members of the commission are chosen by parties. The eleventh mem-
ber, the “President Councilor,” is chosen by the full legislature and must receive two-thirds 
approval. Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [LGIPE]  art. 36, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 23-05-2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio 
/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZX-ZEQK], translated in ELECTORAL 
TRIBUNAL OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, GENERAL LAW ON ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
PROCEDURES OF MEXICO art. 36 (Mikaela Christiansson trans., 2014), http:// 
portales.te.gob.mx/ccje/sites/default/files/GENERAL%20LAW%20ON%20ELECTORAL%20 
INSTITUTIONS%20AND%20PROCEDURES.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB3G-5DB8]. 
 62. This conclusion rests strongly upon Duverger’s Hypothesis, which postulated that 
countries with a simple majority/plurality voting system and single-member districts would 
likely result in two dominant parties. While his theory has been challenged, it has largely been 
validated in American politics. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR 
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Barbara & Robert North trans., Harper 
& Row Publishers 3d ed. 1964) (1951); see also Kenneth Benoit, Duverger’s Law and the 
Study of Electoral Systems, 4 FRENCH POL. 69, 76 (2006), http://www.kenbenoit.net/pdfs 
/Benoit_FrenchPolitics_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE7X-2T93] (challenging Duverget’s 
conclusions as a “law” but still finding some general applicability).  
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on the commission, it still seems likely that the majority party will dominate the 
commission and thus have the power to draw district lines in a skewed, partisan man-
ner. Allowing the tiebreaker seat to be occupied by the Speaker of the House is a 
poor solution for the same reason—the majority party can drive the agenda of the 
commission. 
The final option—requiring seats to be designated for an independent party or for 
a person deemed impartial by both parties—is the most viable option. While desig-
nating seats to an independent party does not seem viable in most parts of America 
due to the dominant two-party system,63 requiring the commissioner with the tie-
breaking vote to be impartial is a good solution, since it forces the parties to agree on 
an impartial member who will have the final say in disputes. In fact, this is very 
similar to the approaches adopted by Arizona and Washington.64 
2. Executive Branch 
When the power of choosing commissioners is delegated to the executive branch, 
the process is generally carried out in one of three ways. First, a number of small 
countries (Antigua and Barbuda,65 Barbados,66 Belize,67 Malta,68 Mauritius,69 St. 
Kitts and Nevis,70 and Trinidad and Tobago71) require the executive to appoint com-
missioners in consultation with the legislature.72 Thus, while the executive is not 
bound by the legislature’s recommendation, the executive is required to get its input 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. For a brief historical evolution of the American two-party system, see generally MARK 
A. LAUSE, THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION IN 
THE SERVICE OF POWER, PRIVILEGE AND CAPITAL (2015), http://www.solidarity-us.org 
/files/The%20Two-Party%20System%20in%20the%20United%20States.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/F9LZ-WA5W]. For an argument that a stable presidential system must only have two 
strong parties to be effective, see Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism, Multiparty Systems, and 
Democracy: The Difficult Equation (Helen Kellogg Inst. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 
144, 1990), https://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/144.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/97LZ-LKNU].  
 64. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)–(8) (requiring the fifth commissioner to be an 
Independent and to be chosen by the other four commissioners); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(2) 
(requiring the members chosen by majority/minority leaders to choose the fifth member).  
 65. CONST. OF ANT. & BARB. § 63(1).  
 66. CONST. OF BARB. § 41A(3). 
 67. CONST. OF BELIZE § 88(1)–(2).  
 68. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(3). 
 69. CONST. OF MAURITIUS § 38(1). 
 70. CONST. OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS § 49(1) (St. Kitts & Nevis).  
 71. CONST. OF TRIN. & TOBAGO § 71(3). 
 72. The weight of the recommendations of the majority and minority leaders probably 
vary contextually. Each of the constitutions for these countries seems to be geared at giving 
these recommendations as much weight as possible. See supra notes 65–71.  
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before making a decision. Second, some countries, such as the Gambia,73 Lesotho,74 
Seychelles,75 the Solomon Islands,76 Swaziland,77 and Vanuatu,78 require the execu-
tive to appoint commissioners after consulting with an independent commission, 
although, once again, the executive is not bound by the commission’s recommenda-
tions.79 A final option, utilized by Bangladesh,80 Germany,81 Hong Kong,82 Sri 
Lanka,83 and Tonga,84 is direct appointment, where the executive is not required to 
consult with any other branch of government or independent commission.85 While 
this option may appear ripe for abuse, appointments are generally subject to other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. In the Gambia, the executive chooses candidates on the advice of both the Judicial 
Service Commission and the Public Service Commission. CONST. OF GAM. § 42(3). While the 
Public Service Commission is entirely composed of candidates appointed by the executive, id. 
§ 172, the Judicial Service Commission is much more balanced: its membership includes the 
chief justice, a judge from a superior court, the solicitor general, a legal practitioner appointed 
by the attorney general, one member appointed by the president, and one member appointed 
by the National Assembly, id. § 145. 
 74. In Lesotho, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an ad-
visory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independent. CONST. OF 
LESOTHO §§ 66(1), 132. This body still serves the function of recommending to the executive 
a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id. § 66(1).  
 75. In Seychelles, the president chooses the members of the committee on the advice of 
the Constitutional Appointment Authority, a three-person body. CONST. OF SEY. art. 115.A; id. 
art. 140, § 1. One member of this body is chosen by the president, and one is chosen by the 
Leader of the Opposition. Id. art. 140, § 2. Together, these members are supposed to choose a 
third member to sit on the committee with them. Id. Uniquely, this body then chooses seven 
members, of which the president serves five to sit on the Electoral Commission. Id. art. 115.A. 
 76. In the Solomon Islands, members are recommended by the Judicial and Legal Service 
Commission, an advisory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independ-
ent. CONST. OF THE SOLOM IS. §§ 53(1)(a), 117. This body still serves the function of recom-
mending to the executive a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id. 
§ 53(1)(a).  
 77. In Swaziland, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an 
advisory body of the executive that is not generally designed to be independent. CONST. OF 
SWAZ. §§ 90(2), 159(1). This body still serves the function of recommending to the executive 
a set of qualified candidates to hold these committee seats. Id. § 90(2).  
 78. In Vanuatu, members are recommended by the Judicial Service Commission, an 
executive advisory body. CONST. OF VANUATU art. 18, § 1; id. art. 48, § 1.  
 79. See supra notes 73–78.  
 80. CONST. OF BANGL. § 118, cl. 1.  
 81. Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Elections Act], July 23, 1993, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1288, as amended, § 3(2), translation at http:// 
aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/DE/germany-federal-elections-act-1993/at_download/file 
[https://perma.cc/UJ4X-VJ7Z]. 
 82. Electoral Affairs Commission Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 541, 2, § 3(2), http:// 
www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_pdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/B1CF624C2
B6AA815482575EF0016AA19/$FILE/CAP_541_e_b5.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VXA-YMEV].  
 83. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 1. 
 84. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010) § 4(1), 
http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct
/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UY6-U7MG].  
 85. See supra notes 80–84.  
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constitutional or statutory requirements, so while appointees may have political af-
filiations similar to the executive, they must at least meet certain minimum require-
ments. Thus, even if the commissioners have a partisan bias, they still must be 
qualified.86  
These options are not well suited for the United States because all of them place 
too much power in the hands of the executive. In these options, the executive has 
discretion to appoint commissioners that are members of his political party and stack 
the commission in much the same way that a partisan legislature could. While this 
may work in a country like Germany run by a coalition executive who can be voted 
out by the Parliament, it is unlikely to work in a country like the United States where 
the executive is not directly responsible to the people.  
3. Judicial Branch 
Only two countries delegate the sole power of choosing commissioners to their 
judicial branches. Costa Rica requires a two-thirds majority vote from the Supreme 
Court of Justice87 to approve commissioners.88 Meanwhile, Turkey’s system utilizes 
both an appellate and an administrative court, with each court choosing a set number 
of commissioners.89 
While the idea of granting the judiciary the sole power of choosing commissioners 
has some appeal, it should be rejected in the United States for three reasons. First, 
even though judges are chosen to impartially apply the law, a large body of recent 
social-science research indicates that judges are prone to rely heavily on their per-
sonal feelings and ideological leanings.90 This does not mean that the judiciary would 
choose commissioners in a more biased manner than the legislature, but it does indi-
cate a need for caution before delegating this task solely to the judiciary. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. In some countries, these qualifications limit the individuals that may be selected for 
the Commission (for example, in some countries an individual must be the surveyor general 
or chief statistician); other meaningful checks include requiring that the appointee is not politi-
cally involved. See infra Part III.B.  
 87. The Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica comprises four subcourts, including three 
Cassation Courts and a Constitutional Court. The members of the court are elected for eight-
year terms by the legislature. Thus, committee members are certainly not chosen by the legis-
lature, but since the term limits of the justices are short, the legislature presumptively has some 
degree of influence since they appoint the justices who appoint commissioners. For a brief 
overview of the court, see DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF COSTA RICA, 
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/cri/en_cri-int-des 
-gen.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3HJ-ZKKK].  
 88. Costa Rica is the only country to choose commissioners in this manner. Código 
Electoral [Electoral Code], Ley No. 8765, art. 13, https://www.tse.go.cr/pdf/normativa 
/codigoelectoral.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DJP-3CMU].  
 89. This system is utilized in Turkey. While eleven members are appointed, only seven 
serve. The other four are alternates. Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter 
Registration, Law No. 298, Apr. 26, 1961, as amended, art. 11 (Turk.), https://www.ecoi 
.net/file_upload/1504_1220346141_law-on-basic-provisions-on-elections-and-voter-registers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H43Z-BELK].  
 90. See supra note 355.  
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the second concern is that the public would notice the effect that the judiciary’s ide-
ological leanings have on its decisions, a result that would compromise the public’s 
perception of the impartiality of the judiciary. A final concern is judicial economy 
and expertise, as many judges would not possess knowledge regarding how to draft 
redistricting plans.  
4. Multiple Branches 
A majority of countries structure their commissions so that multiple branches 
have a substantial say in choosing commissioners. Countries that involve more than 
one branch in the process generally utilize a combination of approaches stemming 
from six different methodological families.91  
The first family of options requires the legislative and executive branches to work 
together in a partisan way. Once again, “partisan” here means that there is no affirm-
ative check on the majority party. Countries operationalize this method in three ways. 
First, some countries such as Eritrea,92 Kiribati,93 Liberia,94 Sierra Leone,95 
Tajikistan,96 Tanzania,97 Turkmenistan,98 Uganda,99 and Zambia100 require majority 
legislative approval of candidates chosen by the executive.101 A second option, uti-
lized by the Maldives,102 New Zealand,103 and Ukraine,104 requires the executive to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Once again, this framework has been created by the author simply as an analytical 
tool to understand the distinctions between various countries. 
 92. ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q54D-LHPV]. 
 93. In Kiribati, the executive chooses candidates after consultation with his cabinet. 
CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 62(2). The decisions are laid before the legislature, but are assumed 
accepted unless they are affirmatively rejected. Id. § 62(3).  
 94. Liberian electoral law requires the president to choose candidates “with the advice 
and consent of the senate.” REPUBLIC OF LIBER., THE NEW ELECTIONS LAW s. 2.1 (2011), 
http://www.necliberia.org/admin/pg_img/Election%20Law%20Incorporated%202011final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V3ZZ-L445]. 
 95. CONST. OF SIERRA LEONE § 32(3).  
 96. Tajikistan requires candidates to be approved by the lower house. On Elections to the 
Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dec. 10, 1999, as amended, art. 11, 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6930 [https://perma.cc/NH4T-5R4S]. 
 97. CONST. OF TANZ. art. 74(1). 
 98. ELECTORAL CODE OF TURK., art. 21, http://www.legislationline.org/download/action 
/download/id/5097/file/Turkmenistan_law_approval_Electoral%20Code_2013_en.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/JJR4-WNDS]. 
 99. CONST. OF UGANDA art. 60, cl. 1.  
 100. Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 17 (1996) § 4(3), http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFY8 
-R6F8].  
 101. See supra notes 92–100.  
 102. CONST. OF MALDIVES art. 168. 
 103. In New Zealand, approved candidates specifically come from the lower house. 
Electoral Act 1993, s 4D. 
 104. LAW OF UKRAINE ON THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION, art. 6, 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7148 [https://perma.cc/6PNB-5YSB].  
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choose candidates from a list of nominees chosen by the legislature.105 Finally, 
Belarus106 and Zimbabwe107 allow the executive and legislative branches each to 
choose a set number of commissioners.108 
 None of these options are good for state commissions in the United States be-
cause they can place too much power in the hands of the majority. This is especially 
dangerous because it keeps the majority party in power and marginalizes competing 
ideas, undermining the democratic process. While the executive could serve as a 
powerful check on the legislature if the executive is from an opposing party, if the 
executive is from the same party there is likely to be collusion (deliberate or not) 
between the branches, and the resulting commission will likely be highly biased. 
While this sort of commission might be effective when a state legislative majority 
has a different party affiliation than the governor, this method fails to account for 
situations where a party controls the legislative and executive branches. Thus, this 
method fails to account for certain electoral outcomes and should be discarded be-
cause of the risk of biased results.  
Second, some countries require the legislative and executive branches to work 
together in a bipartisan manner, thus seeking to validate concerns from majority and 
minority parties. This option is bipartisan because it seeks to accommodate both ma-
jority and minority parties, instead of leaving commissioner appointment solely in 
the hands of the majority party. The first option, utilized only in St. Vincent, allows 
both the majority and minority party (or theoretically a percentage of each party in a 
country with a coalition government) to choose an equal number of commissioners, 
while allowing the executive to choose the tiebreaker.109 A second method, utilized 
in Dominica,110 Grenada,111 and St. Lucia,112 allows the executive to choose an equal 
number of members from the majority and minority parties while granting the tie-
breaker seat to the Speaker of the House.113 A third method, utilized in Pakistan114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See supra notes 102–04.  
 106. In Belarus, six members of the commission are chosen by the president, and six are 
chosen by the legislature (Council of the Republic). These individuals are recommended to 
the national branches by regional committees. Electoral Code of the Republic of Belarus, No. 
370-Z, Feb. 11, 2000, as amended, art. 32, http://www.sze.hu/~smuk/Nyilvanossag_torvenyek 
_east_south_eur/Jogforr%C3%A1sok/V%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1si/BEL%20-%20Electoral 
%20Code.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQV5-ZSG5].  
 107. In Zimbabwe, the president chooses the committee chair “after consultation with the 
Judicial Service Commission” and the legislature. CONST. OF ZIM. § 238(1)(a) The other eight 
members are chosen from a list proposed by the legislature. Id. at § 238(1)(b).  
 108. See supra notes 106–07.  
 109. CONST. OF ST. VINCENT § 32(1). 
 110. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(2).  
 111. CONST. OF GREN. § 55(1).  
 112. CONST. OF ST. LUCIA § 57(2).  
 113. See supra notes 109–12.  
 114. In Pakistan, the prime minister and Leader of the Opposition present a list of names 
to the president; from that list, he can nominate whom he will. CONST. OF PAK., art. 213, cl. 2A 
(authorizing the committee). A description of the electoral process can be found on the 
Electoral Commission of Pakistan’s website. Overview of ECP, ELECTION COMM’N OF PAK., 
http://ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=21 [https://perma.cc/RM9Y-L2H7]. 
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and Yemen,115 requires legislators from both (or all) parties to approve a list of can-
didates from which the executive can choose.116 A fourth method, utilized only in 
Sudan117 and South Sudan,118 allows the executive to nominate commissioners sub-
ject to a two-thirds majority approval vote in the legislature.119 A final method, uti-
lized in both Georgia120 and Guyana,121 allows the executive to choose slightly less 
than half of the commissioners, while the majority and minority parties equally 
choose the other commissioners.122 
These global alternatives are likely to have varying degrees of success in the 
United States. First, allowing majority and minority parties to choose an equal num-
ber of commissioners while delegating the tiebreaker vote to the executive seems to 
do little to fix the problem of a party controlling a majority of seats on the commis-
sion. Since the governor is usually a member of the majority or minority party, one 
party will still have direct control of the commission. Granting the tiebreaking vote 
to the stateSpeaker of the House fails for the same reason, since it grants the majority 
party unchecked control of the commission.  
Allowing the executive to choose commissioners from a list approved by the leg-
islature as a whole may have more success at balancing the interests at stake. Since 
the legislature as a whole must agree on the candidates, presumably they will be more 
moderate in order to receive the nomination. However, it seems likely that this will 
result in the executive cherry-picking candidates identified by the legislature that are 
most ideologically similar to the executive’s party. Allowing the executive to choose 
candidates subject to a two-thirds approval vote in the legislature, is, in many ways, 
similar to the current judicial nominations process in the United States.123 While this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. In Yemen, the legislature must nominate fifteen members to the executive for 
consideration; those fifteen must receive approval from at least two-thirds of the legislature. 
GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM LAW art. 19 (2001), http://publicofficialsfinancial 
disclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Yemen_General%20Elections 
%20and%20Referendum%20Law_2001_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KTF-AN5A].  
 116. See supra notes 114–15.  
 117. National Elections Act 2008 § 6(1) (Sudan), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads/sites 
/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS-ACT-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NDW-3K9R] 
(requiring approval of the vice president as well). 
 118. National Elections Act, 2012, § 10(1) (S. Sudan), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content 
/uploads/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TAR-HA6C]. 
 119. See supra notes 117–18.  
 120. In Georgia, five members are chosen by the president, while the remaining seven 
members are chosen by various legislative parties. The committee chairman is nominated by 
the president, subject to approval by the legislature. ORGANIC LAW OF GEORGIA: ELECTION 
CODE OF GEORGIA art. 10, paras. 1–2 (2012), http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files 
/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Georgia_EN_-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4NY 
-GPPJ]. 
 121. In Guyana, the Leader of the Opposition nominates six candidates to the president, 
one of whom is chosen as the chairman of the committee. “[A]cting in his or her deliberative 
judgment,” the president chooses three more committee members, and the Leader of the 
Opposition chooses the other three. CONST. OF GUY. § 161, paras. 2–3.  
 122. See supra notes 120–21.  
 123. For an explanation of the current process, see Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling Dis-
trict from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal To Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 
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process has generally worked for the federal judiciary, it has been widely criticized 
for its political nature and the slow speed of confirmation by the legislature.124 Thus, 
this option may not be efficient due to the difficulty of gaining a supermajority of 
votes. Furthermore, if this process went through a legislative committee, similar to 
the U.S. Senate, there would likely be delays in the nominating process, a potentially 
grueling hearings process, and the potential of a delayed floor vote.125 In short, 
partisanship could grind the appointments process to a halt.126  
Finally, allowing the majority and minority parties, as well as the executive, to 
choose candidates is not a good option. The reason for this is that the composition of 
the committee would ultimately be determined by the party affiliation of the execu-
tive, resulting in similar problems to delegating the process solely to a majority of 
the legislature. Once again, the commission could be dominated by a majority group 
that is not required to account for the interests of the minority party. 
Third, some countries require input from the legislative and judicial branches to 
staff commissions. Botswana,127 Canada,128 Honduras,129 Malawi,130 and the United 
                                                                                                                 
 
65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 248–81 (2012). 
 124. The death of Justice Scalia and nomination by President Obama of Chief Judge 
Merrick Garland hurled this issue into the spotlight as a Republican-controlled Senate has 
refused, as of yet, to hold any hearings on Garland. Joan Biskupic, Why Merrick Garland 
Should Keep Hoping, CNN (Oct. 23, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/23/politics/hillary-
clinton-merrick-garland-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/V562-DVUE]; Michael D. Shear, 
Julie Hirschfeld Davis, & Gardiner Harris, Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-
supreme-court-nominee.html [https://perma.cc/227T-ZJQV]. For a more academic perspec-
tive, see, e.g., Michael Teter, Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Con-
firmation Process, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 287 (2012); Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies 
in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012).  
 125. Shenkman, supra note 123, at 248–97. 
 126. For an argument that partisanship is still slowing down the confirmation process, see 
Editorial, Confirm President Obama’s Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/opinion/confirm-president-obamas-judges.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6UXG-EFXU].  
 127. In Botswana, judges are appointed to serve on the committee by the Judicial Service 
Commission, and the remaining members are chosen by the legislature. CONST. OF BOTS. 
§ 65A(1).  
 128. In Canada, boundaries commission members are chosen in each province. Electoral 
Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, § 4, http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S2C2-T66J]. Therefore, in each province, the chief justice chooses one judge 
to serve on the committee, and the other two are chosen by the speaker of the legislature. Id. 
§§ 5–6.  
 129. In Honduras, the Supreme Court of Justice chooses a candidate and an alternate, as 
does each registered party. CONST. OF HOND. art. 52. If there is an even number of commis-
sioners, then the executive appoints an extra member. Id.  
 130. In Malawi, judges are appointed to serve on the committee by the Judicial Service 
Commission, and the remaining members are chosen by the legislature. CONST. OF MALAWI 
§ 75(1).   
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Kingdom131 require these branches to pick a specific number of candidates, but usu-
ally the judiciary chooses the tiebreaking member.132 
Requiring input from both the legislature and the judiciary may be a viable ap-
proach in the United States. While it may not be prudent to grant sole appointment 
power to the judiciary,133 the same concerns are not implicated when the judiciary is 
tasked with choosing one impartial member. Although the judiciary certainly is a 
political branch to some extent, its concern with being perceived as impartial should 
psychologically push the judiciary to choose more impartial candidates than the leg-
islature. While judges may be influenced by their ideology when choosing candi-
dates, this concern is minimized due to the ideally neutral goal of their choice—a 
commissioner who can fairly facilitate the redistricting process. Finally, the process 
of choosing commissioners could be made fairer by requiring a supermajority of jus-
tices to approve a commissioner.  
A fourth method requires the judicial and executive branches to work together 
when choosing commissioners. South Africa is the only country that uses this 
method, which calls for judges to sit on selection panels to nominate candidates that 
the executive eventually approves.134 
This method seems unlikely to succeed in the United States for two reasons. First, 
there may be concerns over delegating sole nomination power to the judiciary since 
it is, to some degree, political and likely to choose candidates somewhat in agreement 
with its ideological leanings.135 However, even if this concern were alleviated, there 
would still be cause for concern if the executive or the legislature had the sole power 
of choosing candidates.  
A fifth method, utilized in Kenya136 and Namibia,137 requires the executive and 
legislative branches to work in concert with an independent selection commission to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. The situation in the United Kingdom is similar to the one in Canada. The Speaker of 
the House serves as the chair of each of the four committees. The deputy chair is a judge of 
the high court of that region. Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/4ZE9-HNY6]. The other two members are chosen by the secretary of state. Id.  
 132. See supra notes 127–31.  
 133. See supra Part III.A.3.  
 134. In South Africa, the selection panel must include a member of the Constitutional 
Court, a judge designated by the chief justice, one member of the Commission for Gender 
Equality, two persons with specific knowledge of boundary demarcation, and the chair of the 
Select Committee of the National Council of Provinces. Local Government: Municipal 
Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 § 8(1), http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a27-98.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3WAR-8GZY]. 
 135. See supra Part III.A.3.  
 136. In Kenya, the Selection Commission consists of two persons (one male and one fe-
male) nominated by the president, two persons (one male and one female) nominated by the 
prime minister, one member from the Judicial Service Commission, one member from 
Kenya’s Anti-Corruption Advisory Board, and one person from the Association of 
Professional Societies of East Africa. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act 
(Act No. 9/2011), as amended, sched. 1, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts 
/IndependentElectoralandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P468-Z454].  
 137. In Namibia, the Selection Commission must include the Chairperson of the Public 
Service Commission, the Chairperson of the Council of the Law Society of Namibia, the 
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choose commissioners for the IRC. In these countries, a selection committee nomi-
nates a set number of candidates, from which the executive appoints commissioners. 
The legislature then votes on approval of these candidates.138 
With slight modifications, this system may work in the United States. Operation-
alizing a selection commission may be difficult; however, it is possible that a com-
mission could be composed of electoral and statistical experts. Bias could be mini-
mized because the executive and legislative branches would have to approve the 
candidates. Finally, it would be important to require a supermajority of votes from a 
selection commission to nominate commissioners in order to avoid partisan appoint-
ments by a simple majority of commissioners.  
The sixth option requires all three branches of government working together to 
approve nominees. This is accomplished in two ways. First, in the Bahamas139 and 
Puerto Rico,140 members of (or appointees from) the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches sit on a commission.141 Second, in Bhutan142 and Thailand,143 members 
of the legislative and judicial branches sit on a selection commission, and the exec-
utive must ratify their nominations.144 
Either option may work in the United States. The first option has potential if mem-
bers are chosen equally from majority and minority parties with a judge serving as 
the tiebreaker. However, partisanship could easily slip in because the executive 
would likely choose a judge that shares his or her ideology. While this would require 
                                                                                                                 
 
Chairman of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Board, the Registrar of the High Court, 
and the Director of the Namibian Qualifications Authority. The law also provides for alter-
nates. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), §6, http://www.ecn.na/documents/27857 
/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https:// 
perma.cc/HU3N-NMSK].  
 138. See supra notes 136–37. 
 139. In the Bahamas, the Speaker of the House serves as the chair of the commission. The 
other committee members include a justice (chosen by the governor-general and the chief jus-
tice), two members of the majority party, and one member of the opposition (chosen by the 
governor-general in consultation with the prime minister and leader of the opposition, respec-
tively). CONST. OF BAH. art. 69, para. 2.  
 140. In Puerto Rico, the chief justice always serves as the chair of the Commission, while 
the governor and senate choose the other two members, who cannot be from the same party. 
P.R. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
 141. See supra notes 139–40.  
 142. In Bhutan, a Selection Commission consisting of the prime minister, chief justice, 
Speaker, Chairperson of the National Council, and Leader of the Opposition nominates mem-
bers to the executive. The executive then must appoint three nominees. ELECTION ACT OF THE 
KINGDOM OF BHUTAN, 2008, § 22 (2008), http://publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure 
.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Bhutan_Election%20Act_2008_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88Z8-EBHW].  
 143. In Thailand, under the 2007 constitution (superseded by an interim constitution in 
2014 and a new constitution in 2016), the Selection Commission contains the president of the 
Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, the president of the 
Supreme Administrative Court, the president of the House of Representatives, the opposition 
leader of the House, and a member appointed by a committee from the Supreme 
Administrative Court. These nominees must then be approved by the executive. CONST. OF 
THAI. (2007) § 231(1).  
 144. See supra notes 142–43.  
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participation from all branches of government and may create a good tiebreaker, the 
degree of executive control shadows this proposition. 
Requiring members of the legislature and the judiciary to select candidates subject 
to executive approval would once again fail to build in protection for minority par-
ties. Even if members of the judiciary were functionally neutral, there would still be 
a high probability that the executive would choose nominees that align with his or 
her predilections. 
A third option, not currently utilized by any country, would require judges of the 
highest court to serve as a selection commission, with the ability to nominate candi-
dates by a two-thirds majority. The executive would then be required to officially 
nominate candidates from this list, subject to final legislative approval. Two potential 
problems here would be gridlock in the legislature if a supermajority of votes is re-
quired for confirmation and potential concerns of overburdening the judiciary.  
5. Popular Elections 
A final alternative for choosing commissioners is electing them by popular vote. 
Currently, this method is utilized only in the Virgin Islands.145 Despite how appealing 
the citizenry would find popular election of commissions, this solution is untenable 
for two reasons. First, since the concept of gerrymandering and the need for an inde-
pendent commission is a subject the population is generally uninformed about, com-
missioners would likely be chosen based on popularity instead of impartiality. The 
second reason directly connects to the first—if commissioners are generally chosen 
based on popularity and party affiliation, the commission will likely face the same 
problems presented by one party controlling a majority of the seats on the commis-
sion. Thus, popular election seems like it would only work in situations where the 
public is well informed about the need for a commission and understands the need 
for commissioners to represent different ideologies, perhaps disparate from the citi-
zens’ perspectives.  
B. Commissioner Requirements 
Various requirements placed on the composition of the committee as a whole, and 
on individual commissioners, also contribute to the independence of commissions. 
These factors include the number of sitting commissioners, the political (or apoliti-
cal) nature of commissioners, the creation of specialized positions on the commis-
sion, and educational or experiential requirements for membership.  
1. Number of Commissioners 
Three approaches are used by countries for establishing the number of commis-
sioners. The first approach, utilized by the vast majority of countries, requires com-
missions to always have a set number of commissioners.146 The second approach, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 41, 47 (1998 & Supp. 2016). 
 146. The vast majority of countries elect this route. For the sake of example, I will only list 
six countries, but there are many more. CONST. OF GUY. § 161; CONST. OF UGANDA, art. 60, 
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utilized by Kiribati,147 Mauritius,148 Trinidad,149 and Zambia,150 requires the appoint-
ing body to discretionarily appoint a number of members within a possible range.151 
The final approach, used in Malawi152 and Malta,153 requires a minimum number of 
commissioners, but creates no maximum number.154  
Of these options, requiring a set number of commissioners is the only viable op-
tion in the United States because the other two options are ripe for abuse. The latter 
two options allow the appointing groups to choose the number of commissioners—
effectively allowing them to pack the commission. Having an uncapped number of 
commissioners is particularly dangerous because it would allow the appointing body 
to add members to the commission and skew its political composition.  
Whether the commission should have an even or odd number of commissioners 
is also significant.155 While in many countries this analysis is complicated by the 
number of parties, in the United States the analysis is simpler due to the prevalence 
                                                                                                                 
 
cl. 1; CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N, REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
AZERBAIJAN art. 24 (2003), http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z2X3-GW9C]; ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7UQ 
-3G22]; Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act No. 3/1997), 
as amended, § 26 (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/papua-new 
-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/7HKC-YR24]; 
Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV7G-FRB4]. 
 147. CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 62(1) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum of five 
commissioners). 
 148. CONST. OF MAURITIUS § 38(1) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum of eight 
commissioners). 
 149. CONST. OF TRIN. & TOBAGO § 71(2) (requiring a minimum of three and a maximum 
of five commissioners). 
 150. Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 17 (1996) § 4(2), http://www.parliament.gov.zm 
/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/9WDW-FQJG](allowing a maximum of five commissioners). 
 151. See supra notes 147–50.  
 152. CONST. OF MALAWI § 75(1) (requiring a minimum of seven commissioners). 
 153. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(2) (requiring a minimum of five commissioners). 
 154. See supra notes 152–53.  
 155. There are many examples of commissions with odd and even numbered constituen-
cies. For a few examples of odd numbered commissions, see CONST. OF GUY. § 161; CONST. 
OF UGANDA, art. 60, cl. 1; and ERITREAN ELECTORAL LAW, art. 4, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil 
/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ERITREA-ELECTION-LAWS.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJP2-654A]. 
For a few examples of even numbered commissions, see CENTRAL ELECTION COMM’N, 
REPUBLIC OF AZER., ELECTION CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN art. 24.1 (2003), 
http://www.msk.gov.az/uploads/qanunvericilik/election_code_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY8H 
-XD8P] (requiring roughly a two-thirds majority vote to approve decrees of the commission); 
Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act No. 3/1997), as 
amended, § 26 (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/pacific/PG/papua-new 
-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/SK6W-T953]; 
and Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, sch. 1 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3LM-XLQW]. 
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of only two major parties.156 A system designed with an odd number of commission-
ers is useful for efficiency reasons, but it also raises questions concerning who should 
have the deciding vote. Even-numbered commissions, on the other hand, allow for 
equal representation of majority and minority parties, and ideally this composition 
forces members to compromise. However, gridlock is also a possibility, which could 
undermine the commission’s work. Neither of these practices is inherently better than 
the other; however, an odd-numbered commission with the most impartial tiebreaker 
possible is likely the most efficient option. The current frustration at gridlock within 
the American system is likely to discourage designers from utilizing a commission 
with an even number of members.157  
2. Political Nature of Commissioners 
In Georgia,158 Namibia,159 Seychelles,160 Sri Lanka,161 and Sudan,162 commission-
ers are required to be “nonpartisan,” or to have no major involvement in a political 
party for a period of time prior to serving on a commission.163 Other countries, such 
as Barbados,164 Canada,165 and Dominica,166 place no serious restrictions on the po-
litical affiliation of members; rather, they seek to balance the number of seats desig-
nated to appointees of majority and minority parties.167 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. See LAUSE, supra note 63.  
 157. Although gridlock was part of the American system when adopted (and deliberately 
so), in recent years there has been severe backlash at the gridlock within government. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Danna Morgan Seligman, The Origins of Political 
Gridlock in the United States: Modeling Institutional Gridlock as Moral Hazard in the United 
States Congress (May 2, 2014) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Stanford University) (on 
file with Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, Stanford University). 
 158. ORGANIC LAW OF GEORGIA: ELECTION CODE OF GEOR. art. 12, para. 4 (2012), http:// 
www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Georgia_EN_
-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6KX-EKHP].  
 159. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), § 7(1)(b)(ii), http://www.ecn.na/documents 
/27857/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https:// 
perma.cc/249D-62RG] (requiring a commissioner to not be an “active politician”). 
 160. CONST. OF SEY. art. 115.B (requiring candidates to not be holding office within a 
political party). 
 161. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 1 (allowing the president to appoint anyone that 
he is convinced is not political). 
 162. National Elections Act 2008 § 6(2), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads 
/sites/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS-ACT-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3AA 
-ATLT] (stating candidates must be “independent, competent, non-partisan and impartial”). 
 163. See supra notes 158–62.  
 164. CONST. OF BARB. § 41A. 
 165. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, §§ 6, 10, http://laws 
.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR73-56TU]. 
 166. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(4).  
 167. A large number of countries place no restriction on political affiliation of candidates 
(except that they cannot hold or run for political office while a commissioner). For a few 
examples, see supra notes 164–66.  
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While both of these approaches could be effective in the United States, limiting 
political affiliation for all commission members seems to be an unlikely outcome. 
Americans tend to be highly political, particularly amongst those with the qualifica-
tions to be in the public service.168 Limiting an individual’s ability to have political 
affiliations would make it difficult to find qualified, competent individuals to serve 
on the independent commissions.169 Rather, allowing commissioners to maintain 
party affiliations in a balanced manner would best facilitate the work of IRCs. Thus, 
instead of trying to ignore the political leanings of commissioners, we would seek to 
use them to give the commission more perspective. For instance, if a commission is 
composed of an even number of commissioners, one-half each could come from the 
majority and minority parties. However, if a commission requires an odd number of 
commissioners, a tiebreaker seat may be delegated either to an individual with no 
party affiliation or an individual deemed by the other members of the commission to 
be impartial.170 This decreases the administrative concerns of requiring all commis-
sioners to be impartial but still honors the role of an impartial arbiter helping to guide 
the competing interests of political parties. 
3. Specialized Positions 
Another method of limiting who can sit on the commissions requires an individual 
to obtain special qualifications before sitting on the commission. While countries 
require many different specialized requirements to hold office, three may be of par-
ticular interest for the United States. These qualifications include either requiring one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. Avi Tuschman, Why Americans Are So Polarized: Education and Evolution, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/why 
-americans-are-so-polarized-education-and-evolution/284098/ [https://perma.cc/9QRN-B2M3] 
(arguing that Americans are polarized due to the community groups they sort themselves into).  
 169. It is unclear whether this would also raise First Amendment concerns. Generally, re-
strictions upon political speech are highly suspect. While it seems likely that political speech 
could not be regulated, the case of Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), may 
indicate this could be permissible. In Williams-Yulee, the Supreme Court deemed that certain 
content-based restrictions upon candidates running for judicial office were justified because 
the government had a compelling interest in the independence of the judiciary and the re-
strictions were narrowly tailored. Id. at 1658–60. While it could be argued that there is a “com-
pelling interest” in the independence of an IRC commissioner, it seems likely that not allowing 
any political affiliation could potentially not be a narrowly tailored restriction. This sort of 
restriction would certainly raise a complex and novel First Amendment concern.  
 170. This is the way that the process is done in Arizona’s IRC. Frequently Asked Questions, 
ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING COMMISSION (2011), http://azredistricting.org/About-IRC/FAQ.asp 
[https://perma.cc/Y8HR-X6TW].  
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commissioner to be the head statistician,171 one to be the surveyor general,172 or one 
to be a current or former judge.173  
Requiring the tiebreaker commissioner in the United States to hold one of these 
offices might be particularly useful because, in the case of the surveyor general and 
head statistician, these people are experts at parts of the redistricting process. A judge 
might be beneficial for the perception of neutrality that he or she would bring to the 
position. However, such an approach fails to account for the inherent biases these 
individuals would bring to the commission. Nevertheless, these biases may be 
slightly less pronounced than others—since these officeholders are technical experts, 
they may be more prone to see districting as part of their job rather than an oppor-
tunity for partisan advancement. Due to their inherent bias, it seems these officials 
would only be slightly less biased than other commissioners, and thus they are proba-
bly not the best solution.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. In the United States, the head statistician is responsible for providing coordination, 
guidance, and oversight for U.S. federal statistical agencies. KATHERINE K. WALLMAN, U.S. 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ENSURING THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION UPON WHICH PUBLIC 
POLICY IS BASED, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-wallman 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UM-YV3R]. Essentially, this individual is a statistical expert. This 
would be useful for an IRC because a statistician would have useful skills for making sure 
districts are equally populated. Countries requiring the head statistician to serve as a commis-
sioner include Germany, Bundeswahlgesetz [BWG] [Federal Elections Act], July 23, 1993, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 1288, as amended, § 3(2) (requiring the president of 
the Federal Statistical Office to serve), translation at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions 
/europe/DE/germany-federal-elections-act-1993/at_download/file [https://perma.cc/UJ4X-VJ7Z]; 
Papua New Guinea, Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections (Act 
No. 3/1997), as amended, § 26(1)(c) (Papua N.G.), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions 
/pacific/PG/papua-new-guinea-1997-organic-law-on-national-and/at_download/file [https://perma.cc 
/VV7X-ALUY]; and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010)  
§ 4(1)(b), http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/Electoral 
BoundariesAct/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y265-MHRT] 
(requiring a “person with skill and experience as a statistician”). 
 172. A surveyor general is responsible for mapping boundaries and, particularly, laying 
out city sites. Requiring an individual holding this office to sit on the commission would be 
useful because they are used to drawing local boundaries and would understand logical cutoff 
points. Countries requiring the surveyor general to serve as a commissioner include Australia, 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 60(2)(c); Papua New Guinea, Organic Law on 
National and Local-Level Government Elections § 26(1)(b); and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries 
Commission Act § 4(1)(c) (requiring a “qualified surveyor”). 
 173. Many countries require a judge to serve as a commissioner. A few of these include 
the Bahamas, CONST. OF BAH. art. 69, para. 2(b); Germany, Federal Elections Act § 3(2), (re-
quiring a judge from the Federal Administrative Court to be a commissioner); Ireland, 
Electoral Act, 1997 (Act No. 25/1997) § 7(a), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997 
/act/25/enacted/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8LHV-32FP] (requiring a judge of the Supreme Court 
or the High Court); Puerto Rico, P.R. CONST. art. III, § 4 (requiring the chief justice to serve); 
Tanzania, CONST. OF TANZ. art. 74(1)(a) (requiring a judge of the High Court or a justice of 
the Court of Appeals to serve); and Tonga, Electoral Boundaries Commission Act § 4(1)(a)  
(requiring a “person who holds or has held judicial office”). 
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4. Educational and Experiential Requirements  
Finally, most countries place educational and experiential requirements on com-
missioners. Generally, commissioners are required to either specifically hold a de-
gree in law or are more generally allowed to hold any bachelor’s degree.174 Experi-
ential requirements are slightly more varied, as some countries require as little as 
three years of any work experience,175 while others demand “experience organizing 
and holding elections and referendums”176 or experience in management, finance, 
governance, public administration, or law.177 
As a general rule, educational and experiential requirements are likely to have a 
positive effect on the process of choosing commissioners. While the presence of un-
necessarily burdensome requirements could prohibit qualified candidates from serv-
ing, requiring advanced education and a range of possible work experiences will en-
sure commissions have members with seasoned and varied perspectives that will aid 
in the difficult process of redistricting.  
C. Removal of Commissioners 
Another significant factor impacting the independence of a commission is what 
body may remove a commissioner and for what reasons. Two methods of removal 
are common: commissioners are either removed by the appointing branch on the rec-
ommendation of a tribunal or directly by the appointing branch. This section will 
examine the reasons for removal and then the removal methods. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. A few examples of these countries include Armenia, ELECTORAL CODE OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 40, pt. 2 (2011), http://res.elections.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8946-2F2S] (requiring at least one of the members to have “legal education 
or a scientific degree in law”); Belarus, Electoral Code of the Republic of Belr., No. 370-Z, 
Feb. 11, 2000, as amended, art. 32, http://www.sze.hu/~smuk/Nyilvanossag_torvenyek_east 
_south_eur/Jogforr%C3%A1sok/V%C3%A1laszt%C3%A1si/BEL%20-%20Electoral%20Code 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/866P-7KDP] (requiring “higher juridical education and experience”); 
the Maldives, CONST. OF MALDIVES art. 169 (requiring commissioners to “possess the educa-
tional qualifications . . . necessary to discharge the functions of the Elections Commission”); 
Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales [LGIPE] art. 36, para. 1(d), Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 23-05-2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx 
/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CFG-ZTNB] (requiring candidates 
to have held a bachelor’s degree for five years prior to appointment), translated in ELECTORAL 
TRIBUNAL OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, supra note 611; and Thailand, CONST. OF THAI. (2007) 
§ 230(2) (requiring at least a bachelor’s degree). 
 175. E.g., ORGANIC LAW OF GEOR.: ELECTION CODE OF GEOR. art. 12, para. 4 (2012), 
http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/August%202012,%20Election_Code_of_Geor
gia_EN_-_codified.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW56-JUW4]. 
 176. Electoral Code of the Republic of Belr. art. 32.  
 177. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (Act No. 9/2011), as 
amended, § 6(2)(c), http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/IndependentElector 
alandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN99-SV4V] (allowing mem-
bers who hold any of these qualifications in Kenya). 
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1. Removal Causes 
Currently, three major reasons exist to remove commissioners from office: a 
standard of misconduct (generally undefined by the enabling statutory or constitu-
tional language),178 inability to discharge duties as a commissioner,179 and absentee-
ism from commission meetings.180  
In the United States, one main concern should be preventing arbitrary application 
of the standards for misconduct. Accordingly, those standards must be well defined 
and guilt must be subject to the findings of a tribunal. For example, there should be 
concrete examples of misconduct embedded within the law defining what actions 
constitute misconduct. Removal standards provide an important check on commis-
sioners: they ensure that commissioners do their job and maintain a healthy respect 
for their position and for the law. However, removal standards must be concrete and 
coupled with a procedurally sound mechanism for removal, or the commission could 
easily be cowed by an aggressive legislature.  
2. Removal by Tribunal 
Before allowing the appointing branch to remove a commissioner, many countries 
require a tribunal to find that the commissioner should be removed. Countries utilize 
three different types of panels to achieve this function. First, Armenia,181 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. There are obvious concerns over the generalized nature of the misconduct standard. 
While in one sense it is useful as a catch-all category (as opposed to defining each crime that 
could lead to removal), it could easily lead to commissioners being dismissed for petty crimes. 
Example countries with a misconduct standard include Antigua & Barbuda, CONST. OF ANT. 
& BARB. § 63(5); Kenya, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act § 10(8)(b) 
(referring to removal of the committee secretary); Liberia, REPUBLIC OF LIBER., THE NEW 
ELECTIONS LAW s. 2.2 (2011), http://www.necliberia.org/admin/pg_img/Election%20Law 
%20Incorporated%202011final.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7CE-V3ME]; New Zealand, Electoral 
Act 1993, s 4G,  (allowing removal for “just cause”); and Uganda, CONST. OF UGANDA art. 60, 
cl. 8, para. b.  
 179. Example countries include Dominica, CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(6); Lesotho, CONST. 
OF LESOTHO § 66(4); Malta, CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(7); Tonga, Electoral Boundaries 
Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010)  § 4(1)(c)(ii), http://www.tongaelections.com 
/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct/electoralboundariescommissio
nact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D827-RG4Y]; Ukraine, LAW OF UKR. ON THE CENTRAL 
ELECTION COMMISSION art. 30, § 4(9), http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action 
/popup/id/7148 [https://perma.cc/6PNB-5YSB]; and Zambia, Electoral Commission Act, Cap. 
17 (1996) § 5(3)(a), http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/Electoral 
%20Commission%20Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KS6-8DRJ]. 
 180. Countries including this requirement are Albania, ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 18 
(Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. & trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania 
/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/D3AM-4T84]; Sudan, National Elections Act 2008 
§ 8(1)(a), http://nec.org.sd/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/09/THE-NATIONAL-ELECTIONS 
-ACT-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAF2-XWET]; and South Sudan, National Elections Act, 
2012, § 12(1)(a), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT 
-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV2N-LDBX]. 
 181. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 43, pt. 5 (2011), http://res.elections 
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Dominica,182 the Gambia,183 Sudan,184 and Yemen185 require that a panel of judges 
determine whether a commissioner should continue sitting.186 A second type of tri-
bunal, used in Belize,187 Malawi,188 and Namibia,189 is composed of the initial can-
didate selection commission.190 Third, Armenia,191 Bosnia and Herzegovina,192 and 
South Sudan193 require the other commissioners to recommend that their fellow com-
missioner be removed.194 
In the United States, requiring a panel of state judges (perhaps from the state’s 
highest court) to rule on commissioner competence or conduct is an appropriate fo-
rum because judges are already qualified to rule on judicial matters.195 The idea of a 
selection commission seems less likely to work, unless a well-established, permanent 
selection commission is in place to hear these complaints. The main concern is that 
reconvening the selection commission may be quite difficult, especially if judges, 
legislators, or other government officials staffed the selection commission. Requiring 
other commissioners to remove their compatriots may be efficient, but there are two 
potential issues. The first concern is that opposing commissioners may try to get each 
other booted off the commission; however, this concern could likely be mitigated by 
requiring a supermajority of commissioners for removal. The second concern is that 
commissioners will be reticent to remove their compatriots, either because they are 
                                                                                                                 
 
.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8NL-QG8T] (allowing termination by the 
Administrative Court). 
 182. CONST. OF DOMINICA § 56(7)–(8) (allowing removal by president after a tribunal ap-
pointed by the chief justice has determined this is the proper course of action). 
 183. CONST. OF GAM. § 42(6) (requiring a tribunal of superior-court judges to find guilt). 
 184. National Elections Act of 2008 § 8(2) (requiring commissioners to appoint judges to 
serve on the tribunal). 
 185. GENERAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUM LAW art. 22, cl. c (2001), http:// 
publicofficialsfinancialdisclosure.worldbank.org/sites/fdl/files/assets/law-library-files/Yemen_General 
%20Elections%20and%20Referendum%20Law_2001_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/978Z-5CG4] 
(allowing removal by executive after an “irrevocable court order” is given). 
 186. See supra notes 181–85.   
 187. CONST. OF BELIZE § 88(7)–(8).  
 188. CONST. OF MALAWI § 75(4).  
 189. Electoral Act, 2014 (Act No. 5/2014), § 11(4)–(5), http://www.ecn.na/documents 
/27857/193258/Electoral+Act+5+of+2014.pdf/1bd1c3e3-bdd1-4183-a2fa-2ae6e397180e [https:// 
perma.cc/5842-KNHM] (requiring the Selection Committee to investigate, followed by re-
moval on the order of the executive with the approval of the National Assembly). 
 190. See supra notes 187–89.  
 191. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 43, pt. 3 (2011), 
http://res.elections.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8NL-QG8T] (allowing ter-
mination by a two-thirds vote of fellow commissioners). 
 192. ELECTION LAW OF BOSN. AND HERZ. art. 2.5 (2002), http://www.constitutionnet.org 
/files/BiH%20Election%20Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4T5-7PM5] (requiring the committee 
to notify the legislature for removal). 
 193. National Elections Act, 2012, § 12(2), http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77B-PZVT] (allowing 
removal upon recommendation of two-thirds of the commissioners). 
 194. See supra notes 191–93.  
 195. It doesn’t really matter what level of court hears these issues, although perhaps for the 
purposes of judicial authority a higher-level court would make more sense.  
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friends or because they fear the damage that removal could do to the perception of 
the commission.196 
3. Direct Removal 
The alternate option is allowing the appointing branch or branches to directly re-
move commissioners. This occurs in four permutations. In Sri Lanka,197 Tonga,198 
and Zimbabwe,199 the executive branch has the sole power of removal.200 In 
Albania201 and Tajikistan,202 the legislative branch has this power.203 The executive 
and legislative branches are required to work together in Malta204 and St. Kitts and 
Nevis205 to remove commissioners.206 Finally, in Thailand, the legislative and judi-
cial branches are required to work in concert to remove commissioners.207 The big-
gest problem is that the provisions enabling direct removal are often vague and thus 
could grant the appointing body significant discretion in removal. Without clear 
standards, removal is far more likely to be arbitrary.  
In the United States, most of these options do not seem consistent with the goals 
of an independent commission unless the standards for removal are clear. Allowing 
either the executive or legislative branches to remove members at their discretion 
risks commissioners being removed for political reasons. For example, if members 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. Various concerns are implicated here, from peer pressure to favoritism. Due to these 
concerns, this seems like a bad answer for the removal process.  
 197. CONST. OF SRI LANKA art. 95, para. 2.  
 198. Electoral Boundaries Commission Act 2010 (Act No. 15/2010) § 4(1)(c)(ii), 
http://www.tongaelections.com/images/stories/TECdocuments/ENG/ElectoralBoundariesAct
/electoralboundariescommissionact2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JKN-FBV9]. 
 199. CONST. OF ZIM. § 237(3) (referring to the process of removing judges, which, pursuant 
to § 187(2), (4), requires the executive to appoint a panel at the discretion of the executive. 
The only limitation on the panel members is that one members must be a former judge.) 
 200. See supra notes 196–99.  
 201. ALBANIAN ELECTORAL CODE art. 18(2) (Org. for Sec. & Cooperation in Europe ed. & 
trans., 2015), http://www.osce.org/albania/159501?download=true [https://perma.cc/G3UW 
-A2BQ] (requiring a motion by the Central Election Commission and then legislative 
approval). 
 202. On Elections to the Majlisi Oli of the Republic of Tajikistan, Dec. 10, 1999, as 
amended, art. 18, http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/6930 [https:// 
perma.cc/H849-ZAFP] (allowing removal by the organ that chose them—the legislature). 
 203. See supra notes 201–02.  
 204. CONST. OF MALTA art. 60(6) (The Maltese Constitution provides that “a member of 
the Electoral Commission may be removed from office by the President acting in accordance 
with the advice of the Prime Minister.” While the prime minister could accurately be consid-
ered an executive (along with the president), the prime minister is also the head of the legisla-
tive branch. In that sense, this provision is akin to granting advisory power to the Speaker of 
the House or president of the senate. Thus, the executive must weigh in, as must the prime 
minister, who is the de facto representative of the legislative branch). 
 205. CONST. OF ST. KITTS & NEVIS § 49(2)(d) (St. Kitts & Nevis). 
 206. See supra notes 204–05.  
 207. The only example of this sort of removal is Thailand. CONST. OF THAI. (2007) § 233 
(requiring one-tenth of the members of the legislature to call for removal, prompting an inves-
tigation by the Constitutional Court). 
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of the commission made decisions that hurt the party with a majority in the legisla-
ture, that party could vote to remove the commissioner. This could potentially poison 
the decisions of the commissioners, since removal would effectively be a veto on 
commission decisions. While requiring the executive and legislative branches to 
work together in removal might mitigate this if the executive and the majority of the 
legislature are from different parties, there is no check if they are from the same 
party. As mentioned before, this concern could be mitigated by clear standards, re-
quiring the appointing parties to go through well-defined procedures before remov-
ing commissioners. 
Requiring the judiciary and legislature to work together to remove commissioners 
seems to be a viable option when used in conjunction with concrete removal stand-
ards. This approach allows the judiciary, a branch whose goal is objectivity, to work 
together with one of the political branches. In effect, this method of removal could 
function similarly to removal through a tribunal: the judiciary could determine 
whether a violation of the law occurred, and the legislature could remove an offend-
ing commissioner.  
D. Powers of the Commission  
Independent commissions around the world can serve two functions. Some com-
missions issue binding decrees, while others issue nonbinding recommendations, 
subject to the approval of the legislature.  
1. Binding Decrees 
In some countries, such as Armenia,208 Lesotho,209 Thailand,210 and Turkey,211 
commissions issue binding decrees, subject to no explicit appeals process.212 Yet, 
other countries, including Kenya,213 Malawi,214 Palau,215 South Sudan,216 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. ELECTORAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARM. art. 36, pt. 2 (2011), http://res.elections 
.am/images/doc/_ecode.pdf [https://perma.cc/E86U-N7SU] (making all acts within the scope 
of the commission’s power binding). 
 209. CONST. OF LESOTHO § 67(4) (making all acts of the commission binding upon the 
dissolution of the legislature). 
 210. CONST. OF THAI. (2007)  § 236. 
 211. Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registration, Law No. 298, Apr. 26, 
1961, as amended, art. 13, https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1504_1220346141_law-on-basic 
-provisions-on-elections-and-voter-registers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YUZ-584J]. 
 212. In all countries, matters can at least theoretically be appealed if the committee acts 
contrary to its mandate. For example countries, see supra notes 208–11.  
 213. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act (Act No. 9/2011), as 
amended, sched. 5, §§ 4–5, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/Independent 
ElectoralandBoundariesCommissionNo9of2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3HU-XB72] (requir-
ing appeals to the High Court to be made within thirty days). 
 214. CONST. OF MALAWI § 76(3).  
 215. CONST. OF PALAU art. IX, § 4(c) (allowing appeal by the Supreme Court). 
 216. National Elections Act, 2012, § 43, http://www.ku.ac.ke/actil/wp-content/uploads 
/2015/07/ELECTION-ACT-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP7E-APLD] (allowing 
appeal within fourteen days to the High Court). 
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Uganda,217 allow for the commission’s decisions to be challenged in the nation’s 
highest court within a narrow time window before going into effect.218 Decisions are 
generally appealable by any member of the public for a districting plan that violates 
the principles the commission is required by constitution or statute to follow.219 
Allowing for limited judicial review of binding decisions by a commission would 
be an effective way to implement commissions while still providing oversight for 
partisan districting plans. If the commission is properly composed,220 the minutiae of 
the redistricting plan should be impartially administered. However, courts should 
have some power to review for abuse of discretion or bias in the districting plan, if 
only to place a check on the power of the commission by allowing another body to 
review its decisions.  
2. Recommendations  
Many nations grant commissions only the power to recommend redistricting 
plans, subject to approval by the legislature. The majority of these nations, including 
Canada,221 Kiribati,222 and Swaziland,223 require the legislature to either approve or 
reject the plan in its entirety, without any modifications.224 However, others, such as 
Antigua,225 Belize,226 Grenada,227 and the United Kingdom,228 grant the legislature 
the ability to modify the plan before approving it, although the legislature is supposed 
to show a degree of deference to decisions by the commission.229 
Granting a commission power solely to recommend plans is beneficial because it 
provides an extra layer of review before plans are put into action. This framework 
acts as a check on the commission, keeping it accountable to one of the political 
branches. However, this framework will only act as a meaningful check when the 
commission is not merely a proxy of the majority of the legislature. If the commis-
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. CONST. OF UGANDA art. 64 (allowing appeal to the High Court). 
 218. See supra notes 213–17.  
 219. The seven factors used by the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission fairly 
represent the factors generally used for redistricting: equal population, compactness, contigu-
ousness, compliance with the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, respect for communities 
of interest, incorporation of visible geographic units, and creation of competitive districts that 
are not at odds with the other factors. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 1700. 
 220. See supra Part III.A.  
 221. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3, §§ 21–22, 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/E-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK93-DHUA] (allowing legislative 
members opportunity to make objections and request the commission to change the report). 
 222. CONST. OF KIRIBATI § 63(4)–(5).  
 223. CONST. OF SWAZ. § 92(4) (requiring the king to examine and approve before 
publication). 
 224. See supra notes 221–23.  
 225. CONST. OF ANT. & BARB. § 65. 
 226. CONST. OF BELIZE § 90(3)–(4). 
 227. CONST. OF GREN. § 56.  
 228. Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986, c. 56, §§ 3–4, http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1986/56/pdfs/ukpga_19860056_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVL6-3WG5].  
 229. See supra notes 225–28.  
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sion is merely a proxy, then it is likely to rubberstamp the preferences of the legisla-
ture. Thus, if a commission is structured well (perhaps determined by inclusion of 
members from multiple parties on the commission), then this could provide a mean-
ingful check on the commission by requiring the plan to pass the scrutiny of legisla-
tors. However, there is a concern that if the redistricting plan hurts the interests of 
the majority in the legislature, the legislature will strike down the plan for political, 
self-interested motives. This concern could be mitigated by a requirement that the 
legislature create a report showing any reasons for rejection if the redistricting plan 
is not approved.  
However, allowing the legislature to modify the commission’s plan undermines 
the purpose of having an independent commission. If a majority of the legislators can 
discretionarily change a plan, the redistricting process would be subject to the tyr-
anny of the majority. In this case, the situation might be even worse because the 
people would believe that the commission was in place to check the biases of the 
legislature, while the legislature could still subtly alter the plan at the last moment.  
CONCLUSION 
Examining IRCs through an international lens provides unique and interesting al-
ternatives to structuring redistricting commissions. Instead of the largely single-
branch approach used by many states in America, there are several multibranch 
approaches available that may be more effective than current commissions.230 Other 
approaches demonstrate that the number of commissioners sitting on a commission 
and the qualifications of those commissioners can play a substantial role in shaping 
the expertise and accountability of the IRC’s mission.231 Additionally, they illustrate 
both the need for proper and procedurally fair removal processes232 and delegation 
of powers to commissioners.233 
A number of well-structured commissions both already exist and also could be 
crafted from the analysis of the above factors. However, a commission that is chosen 
by multiple branches with an eye toward proportional representation and an impar-
tial, talented tiebreaking commissioner would be a good starting point for a state 
considering an IRC. In some ways, this process is similar to the one established in 
both Arizona and California, although modifications could be made to either based 
on alternatives.234 Additionally, the commission must be made functionally inde-
pendent by granting it power to issue decrees, subject solely to judicial review.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. See supra Part III.A. 
 231. See supra Part III.B. 
 232. See supra Part III.C. 
 233. See supra Part III.D. 
 234. The commission in Arizona requires a selection commission (the State Commission 
on Appellate Court Appointments) to nominate twenty-five individuals: ten Republicans, ten 
Democrats, and five Independents. Of these, two Republicans and two Democrats sit on the 
commission; amongst themselves they choose the fifth member, an Independent. Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 170. In California, applicants submit their information to the 
Bureau of State Audits; this Bureau chooses forty Republicans, Democrats, and Independents. 
Frequently Asked Questions, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION (2014), 
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html [https://perma.cc/2HWS-NYEF]. The candidates are 
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An example of a five-member commission that complies with the criteria de-
scribed above might look as follows. A panel of randomly assigned judges from the 
state appellate and supreme courts might vet candidates from applications and rec-
ommendations from citizens of the state. The panel would recommend, by super-
majority, between four and ten candidates to the governor. The governor would then 
appoint two members each from the majority and minority parties, subject to ap-
proval by a majority of that candidate’s party. This process would ensure that candi-
dates are competent, of good character, and representative of the party.235  
The final member of the commission could either be an Independent or someone 
with no party affiliation. This person could either go through the same process as 
other candidates, subject to a supermajority vote of approval by the whole legislature, 
or could be chosen by a unanimous vote from the four commissioners sitting on the 
commission. This process, identical to the one used in Arizona, ensures that the can-
didate will be as impartial as possible (since members of both parties must approve) 
and additionally ensures that the candidate will be someone that both parties feel like 
they can work with to get a plan approved. If the commissioners are unable to choose 
their fifth member, then the multibranch approach mentioned above might be utilized 
as a failsafe to ensure the commission will get its job done.236 
Of utmost importance is that commissioners only be removed for concrete, well-
defined causes that are delineated in the constitutional provision or statutes enabling 
the commission. Requiring guilt to be found by a tribunal (such as the state supreme 
court) would ensure that members are not removed solely for political reasons.237  
Finally, it is imperative that the plans of the commission be binding, while subject 
to limited judicial review in the state supreme court. This ensures that the commis-
sion can draw redistricting plans that will not be subject to legislative veto if the plans 
hurt the majority party. However, this provides an appropriate and procedurally fair 
forum for complaints that the redistricting plan is skewed or fundamentally unfair.238  
America stands at a pivotal point in its electoral history. The recent ruling in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission and the 
success of a similar ballot initiative in California have illustrated the ability of con-
cerned citizens to implement electoral reform that will keep the legislatures account-
able and widely representative of the public, enforcing the principle of one person, 
one vote.239 
Independent redistricting commissions are important because they can help “re-
store ‘the core principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the voters should 
                                                                                                                 
 
reduced by that Bureau to twenty of each political affiliation. Id. Leadership of the California 
State Assembly is allowed to then strike twenty-four of the applicants. Id. After this, eight 
members are chosen at random to serve—three Republicans, three Democrats, and two 
Independents. Id. These commissioners choose the other six members. Id. 
 235. See supra Part III.A.  
 236. See supra Part III.A.  
 237. See supra Part III.C.  
 238. See supra Part III.D.  
 239. See Cain, supra note 3, at 1823, 1830. 
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choose their representatives, not the other way around.’”240 As scholars and citizens 
alike recognize the need for restraints on abuses of the districting process by legisla-
tors, it is essential that they find a well-established strategy for solving the problem 




                                                                                                                 
 
 240. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 
(2015) (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 781 
(2005)).   
